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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE. OF UTAH

JOEL H. IZATT,
Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16882

,MARY C. IZATT, by and through
her Guardian and Conservator,
KENNETH G. CLARK,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a divorce action wherein the plaintiff, respondent
and cross-appellant (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff") sought
a divorce from the defendant, appellant and cross-respondent (hereinafter referred to as "defendant") who also sought a divorce by
way of counterclaim.

The parties sought a dissolution of their

marriage and a distribution of the marital estate.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried without a jury to the Honorable Homer
F. Wilkinson, District Judge of the Third Judicial District, on the
Amended Complaint of the plaintiff and the Answer and Counterclaim
of the defendant.

Th~

Court heard testimony of the parties and

various other witnesses and received memoranda and proposals for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the distribution of the marita.l estate on behalf of both parties.
The Court entered a Decree of Divorce granting both parties a
divorce as against the other, granted custody of the parties' four
minor children to the plaintiff pursuant to a stipulation of the
parties and provided for alimony of $1. 00 per year for the defendant
By way of a Supplemental Decree of Divorce, the Court entered a
distribution of property.

This distribution also awarded to the

defendant the net proceeds of the settlement of a malpractice case
brought against several physicians and Intermountain Health Care,
Inc.

This malpractice case arose out of personal injuries suffered

by the defendant.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks to have the portion of the Decree of
Divorce of the District Court which granted the plaintiff a divorce
against the defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty reversed.
The defendant further requests a modification of the property
distribution so as to grant the defendant a lien on real property
owned by the parties to the extent of 1/2 of the equity in the real
property and to relieve the defendant from any payments ordered to
be made to the parents of ~he plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Mary C. Izatt, is the mother of four
chiidren and, P!ior to this action, was the wife of the plaintiff
for 16 yeirs.

(T zg6-297)

The defendant suffers from organic

brain damage and possible psychosis resulting from two cardiac

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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arrests suffered during surgery which the defendant underwent on
May 3, 1973.

(T 413- 414, 450)

The defendant, without being informed

of the nature or permancy of her admission, resided at the Plantation
Convalescent Center from August 28, 1978, until following the time
of trial.

(T 297, 482-483, SOS)
The plaintiff resides at 474 K Street, Salt Lake City,

Utah, along with the four children of the marriage.

(T 296-297)

The plaintiff remarried sometime prior to the hearing held in this
case on October 29, 1979.

(T 270)

The plaintiff testified that the parties' marriage, prior
to the defendant's surgery, was "ideal".

(T 301)

had an ideal relationship with her children.

The defendant

(T 302)

Following

the surgery and the cardiac arrests, the defendant experienced some
difficulty performing household chores on behalf of the family.

(T

441)
The plaintiff's parents moved into the parties' home
shortly after the time of the defendant's surgery.

(T 399)

They

lived in the home for approximately 18 months and periodically
thereafter during the next four or five years.
stays would amount to approximately six months.

These periodic
0

(T 400-401)

The defendant required additional hospital care and was
rehospitalized in January, 1974 at the University of Utah Hospital
because of psychotic behavior (unusual, stressful behavior).

(T

305) Throughout the time since the defendant's surgery, she has
been treated with. ·various med"ications.
included Prolixin and Mellaril.

The:se medications have

(T 307, 415)
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The plaintiff is employed by David W. Evans Advertising
as a commercial artist.

He earns $1, 7Q,Q per month before taxes and

approximately $1,300 per month take home.
ordered that alimony of $1.DO per
the defendant.

ye~r

CT 333)

The Court

be paid by the plaintiff to

(T 98, 156, 227)

During the marriage, the parties accumulated assets of a
significant value.

The parties' home at 47 4 K Street, owned in the

name of the plaintiff and the defendant is worth approximately
$70, 000.

(T 367)

At the time of trial, the first mortgage on the

home was approximately $16,000.
equity in the home is $ 54, 00 0.

(Exhibit 12-P; T 42)
(T 333)

The net

The parties also have

accumulated approximately $10,064 cash value from life insurance
policies on the lives of the plaintiff and the defendant.
12-P, Exhibit 6-P)

(Exhibit

The distribution of the case value of these

insurance policies is not an issue on appeal.

The parties also

accumulated various assets individually or jointly, such as an
automobile, household furnishings, savings and checking accounts,
jewelry, clothing and personal effects, and employee benefit plans
provided by the plaintiff's employer.

The distribution of these

assets is not an issue on appeal.
A medical malpractice action arose out of the defendant's
surgery.

This action has been fully compromised and settled with

the defendant receiving the net proceeds (after attorney's fees
and costs) of $97,320.22.

a

222, 228)

The defendant was also

granted a lieri in th~ amount of $13,500 in the parties' real propert
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at 474 K Street.

This lien is interest free and due and owing upon

the sale of the property, upon the non-use of the property as a
residence for th_e plaintiff and the children and upon the youngest
' child reaching majority.

(T 228)

This lien in favor of the

defendant is for approximatelj 25 percent of the net equity in the
real property .
Mr. Wilford Izatt, the father of the plaintiff, testified
that during the time when he and his wife lived in the Izatt home
1:

that they purchased all of the groceries used in the home.

(T 401-

402) This testimony came from Mr. Izatt's memory and was without
any documentation by way of receipts or other records.
t

During the initial 18 month period, according to Wilford Izatt's

* testimony,

the cost of groceries would have been $200, sometimes

, $250 per month.
1

(T 403)

(T 401)

During the other periodic visits, this

cost was estimated to be approximately $50 to $75 per month.
(T 403)

The plaintiff's parents lived rent free in the parties'

, home and consumed part of the food they purchased.

(T 436)

The plaintiff offered Exhibit 1-P which consisted of 15
~

checks from Wilford L. or Wilda H. Izatt to Joel H. Izatt.
exhibit was received over the objection of the defendant.

~
•1

314)

This
(T 309-

The plaintiff testified that these checks were given to him

to pay bills which were incurred because of the defendant's medical

Wl·

!~)

)Ii

expenses or on behalf of th~ defendant.

~

312-313)

The dates of

the checks begin on Decemoer 15, 1974 and continue periodically
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un ti 1 'Apr i 1 16 , 19 7 g. •

(Ex hi b it 1 - P)

The p 1 a inti ff ' s father

testified that the defendant did not receive the benefit of all
of the money advanced.

CT 43 8)

On cross-ex·amination, the plaintiff admitted that checks
dated November 6, 1978, December 7, 1978, December 22, 1978 and
April 16, 1979, and totalling $3,275 were given to the plaintiff
following the defendant's move to the Plantation Convalescent
Center.

(T 365)

During this period of time, the defendant's

expenses were beirig paid for by the L.D.S. Church.

(T 323)

The

plaintiff further admitted that the plaintiff's parents had provided
him financial assistance prior to the illness of the defendant.
Checks dated August 2 (or 7), 1971 and January 1, 1971 were shown
to the plaintiff

~ho

admitted that they had been given to him prior

to the def end ant's illness.

(T 36 6)

Check No. 4141 dated December 15, 1974 states that the
check was a gift.

Check No. 4303 dated December 24, 1974, states

that it was for Xmas (sic).

(Exhibit 1-P)

The checks in Exhibit 1-P were deposited in account
number 00513580 at Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company in Salt
Lake City.

(Exhibit 1-P)

While these checks were asserted to have

been given to the plaintiff in order to pay medical and other
expenses of the defendant, the checks produced for defendant's
counsel and admitte·d into evidence as Exhibit 13-D, written on the
same account, indicate no payment of medical expenses or other
expenses relating to the· defendant's illness.

(Exhibit 13-D)
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While the plaintiff testified that he had rec~rds to show these
expenses, no such records were produced.

CT 313)

The plaintiff

further agreed to determine how much of the medical expenses of the
defendant were covered by insurance.
was ever presented.

(T 369)

No such determination

(T 39·6-397)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED
A DIVORCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE
DEFENDANT DID NOT TREAT THE PLAINTIFF IN A
MENTALLY CRUEL MANNER.
Utah Code Annotated 30-3-1 states that one of the grounds
for a divorce is "cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental distress to
the plaintiff."

In Johnson

vs.

Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152 P.Zd 426

(1944) a divorce was granted, in part, because the defendant suffered

from diabetes and liver trouble.

This condition was alleged to

have caused the plaintiff great mental distress, anguish and great
mental suffering.

The Court disallowed the granting of a divorce

because of the illness.

The Court stated:

The 'condition' referred to above is
defendant's physical condition, diabetes,
and liver trouble, and the fact that
such condition caused respondent distress
is clearly no ground for divorce.
152 P.Zd at 428.
BTack'·s Law Dic.tio·n·ary ·-_1137 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968), defines
mental cruelty as follows:

-7-
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A course of conduct on th~ part of
one spouse toward the other spouse
which can endanger the· mental and
physical health and efficiency of
the othei spouse to such an extent
as to render continuance of the marital relation intolerable.
Th~

evidence presented to the Court during the trial

shows that the plaintiff and defendant had an "ideal" marriage
prior to the defendant's surgery in May, 1973.

The cardiac arrests

suffered by the defendant resulted in organic brain damage, a
physical condition, which required that the defendant receive
additional care, assistance and medication.

However, the

defend~t

did not embark upon a course of conduct designed to cause great
mental or physical distress to the plaintiff.

To the contrary, the

defendant attempted to improve her ability to function both in the
home and while institutionalized at the Plantation Convalescent
Center.

(T 321, 445-446, 485-486)

The defendant, rather than

acting in a way so as to cause harm to the plaintiff, continued to
attempt to regain, to the extent possible, her prior abilities to
deal with her husband, her family and others.

These actions on

behalf of the defendant do not entitle the plaintiff to a divorce
on the grounds of mental cruelty.

POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR ANY ALLEGED DEBT TO THE PLAINTIFF'S
PARENTS.·
In the supplemental decree of the Court date·d January 15,
1980, each party is required· to assume' and pay one-half of a

-8-
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$10,205 liability to the plaintiff's parents.

~

22S)

The defendant

should not be required to repay any of this amount because:

(1)

the

liability, is supported at best by a moral obligation to repay
which is not consideration for an
a gift; (3)

olH~gation;

(2) the obligation is

significant portions of the claim are not legally

enforceable because they are barred by the statute of limitations
and/or they are not obligations contemplated to be obligations
imposed upon a party under the U_tah Necessity Statute (U.C.A.
30-2-9); and/or, (4)

the evidence is insufficient to establish the

amount of the debt, the terms of payment or the defendant's
responsibility for the debt.
In Manwill vs. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.Zd 177 (1961),
the plaintiff alleged he made payments on behalf of the defendants
and transferred other valuable assets to the defendants.

These

claims were asserted to be enforceable because of the defendants'
oral agreement to repay.

The Court held that the action against

the defendants could not be maintained since the obligation was
based only upon a moral obligation to repay. The Court stated:
The position the plaintiff essays is that
the earlier payments he claims to have made
for the defendants' benefit placed them under
moral obligation to repay him, and that this
constitute~ valid consideration to make their
1957 oral promise a binding contract. The
rule quite generally recogni~ed is that a
moral obligation by itself will not do so.
Although some authorities appear to be otherwise,- it will usually be found that there are
special circumstances bolsteii~g what is termed
the moral o51igation.

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The difficulty we see with ·the doctrine is
that if a mere moral, as distinguished from
a leg.al, obligation were. recognized as valid
con~ideratiori for a contract~ that would
practically erode to the vanishing point the
necessity for finding a consideration. This
is so, first ·becaus~ in nearly all circumstances
where a promise is made theie is some moral
aspect of the situation which provides the
motivation for making the promise even if it
is to make an outright gift. And second, if
we are <lealing with moral concepts, the making
of a promise· itself creates a moral obligation
to peiform it. It seems obVious that if a
contract to b~ legally enforceable need be
anything other than a naked promise, something
more than mere moral consideration is necessary.
The principle that in order for a contract
to be valid and binding, each party must be
bound to give some legal consideration to
the other by conferring a benefit upon
him or suffering a legal detriment at his
request is firmly implanted in the roots
of our law.
In urging that the moral consideration
here present makes a binding contract,
plaintiff places reliance on what is termed
the 'material benefit rule' as reflecting
the trend of modern authority. The substance of that rule is that where the
promisers have received something from
the promisee of value in the form of
money or other material benefits under
such circumstances as to create a moral
obligation to pay for what they received,
and later promise to do so there is consideration for such promise. But even
the authorities standing for that rule
affirm that. there must be something beyond
a bare promise, as of an offered gift or
gratuity. The circumstances must be
suc_h that it is reasonably to be supposed
~hat the promise_e expected to b.e compensated
in some way therefor. (Designation of
promisee and promiser as pl~intiff or
defendant omitted.) Citations omitted)
361 P.Zd at 178-17S

-10-
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This alleged debt to the plaintiff's pa.rents is based
solely upon a moral obligation to repay.

The plaintiff's father,

Wilford Izatt, testified that he advanced money to the plaintiff
and performed painting and other servcies for the plaintiff with
the plaintiff only being obligated to repay if he were able.

Mr.

Izatt further testified that he advanced the money or performed the
services for his son because he was a father and not because he
expected repayment.

(T 433)

Even the plaintiff's promise to repay

if he were able, is not sufficient to create a contractual obligation under Utah law.

According to Manwill, it is required that

the promisee (Mr. Wilford Izatt) expected to be compensated in some
way.
The plaintiff's father testified that he fully intended
to assist the plaintiff because of the father-son relationship.
433)

date.

(T

The agreement to repay the advances never had a specific due
(T 405)

The times for and substance of the discussions re-

garding repayment could only be testified to as to memory.

In

discussions regarding the painting of the house, no amount as to
the amount to be paid was ever determined nor was a time for repayment established.

(T 407)

The indefinite nature of this

testimony points out the actual substance of the agreement between
the plaintiff and the plaintiff's father, i.e. the plaintiff's
father intended to and did make gifts to the plaintiff at various
times.

-11-
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These advances of money were not related to expenses
incident to the defendant's illne·ss.

Had this been the case, no

such payments would have been required such as those received in
1971 and those in 1979.

Further, these obligations were not relati

to the defendant's illnes·s· since during much of the time after the
original lS months when the plaintiff's parents were living

int~

family home, the medical and nursing care for the defendant was
being paid for by the
Irt

M~~e

L.n.s·.

Church or by insurance.

vs. "Tirtgey, 106 Utah 420, 149 P.2d 832 (1944),

the plaintiff desired to

reco~er

a debt allegedly owed by defendut

to the plaintiff as executor of the estate of a decedent.

The

defendant claimed that the decedent had made a gift of the amount
in question.

The Court explained the factors to be considered in

determining whether a transaction is a gift or a loan as follows:
. . . Where, as here, the question is as to
whether the transaction was a loan or a
gift, and neither party can testify thereto,
the circumstances under which the transaction
took place are certainly material in determining the intent of the donor and the ourpose
for which the property was turned ov~r . . .
Th~ relation of the parties, the situation
then existing, and the circumstances under
which the gift was made, including the donor's
previous life, habits and relations to others,
as well as the condition of the donor at the
time of the gift may be considered by the
court; so. too evidence of friendly or affectionate ~elations h~t~~en the parties; that the
partres had resided together; and that the
donee had rendered service to the donor is
admissible ·on the question uf motive and
interit. 149 P.2d at 833-834.

-12-
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In the present case, the testimony showed that the
plaintiff's parents advanced money to the plaintiff before, during
and after the time of the defendant's illness and residence with
the family.

The advances were made out of the plaintiff's

father's belief that he had an obligation to
relationship had existed from

th~

h~lp

his son.

This

time the plaintiff was a boy.

The plaintiff's father would also have helped his other children
in similar ways.

These facts show that the advances made by the

plaintiff's father were intended to be gifts.

The persons making

the advances were not even asserting the claims on their own
behalf.
The plaintiff's parents are not parties to this action.
Therefore, no award should have been made to them as a part of the
Supplemental Decree of Divorce.

At best, the decree should only

have made the parties liable for one-half of any claim to be
asserted by the plaintiff's parents.
Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff can assert a
liability on behalf of his parents, this claim is unenforceable.
In large part, the claim is unenforceable because it is barred by
the statute of limitations.

Further, the claim does not come

within the requirements of the Utah Necessity Statute.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26 requires that an
action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state,
except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Machine-generated., OCR,
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by the statutes of this state be brought within three years.

This

three year statute of limitations applies to actions brought under
the Utah Necessity Statute (Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-·9).
Walker B'r·othe·r's 'Drygo·ods Co., vs·. Whitha11, 61 Utah 259, 212 Pac.
523 (1923).

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25(1) states that "an
action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon u
instrument in writing; . . . " shall be brought within four years.
No action has actually been filed by the parents in order to
determine the timeliness of the assertion of the claim.

Assuming,

arguendo, that the filing of the divorce complaint on December 8,
1978 began the action for recovery, any advances of money or
performance of servcies prior to December 8, 1975, would be barred
by the three year statute of limitations applicable to actions
under the Utah Necessity Statute.

The liability on the basis of an

oral contract would be barred for any claims arising prior to
December 8, 1974.
The plaintiff, during argument in this matter, argued
that the statute of limitations could not be raised as an issue
because Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes a
statute of limitations defense an affirmative defense which must be
specifically ple~ded.

This argument is fallacious because the

collection of the all~ged· debt by the plaintiff's parents is not
the nature of this action.

Th~ cliim for th~ parents is made by

way of a liability asserted By th~ plaintiff in establishing the

-14-
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size and nature of the marital estate.

Therefore, the statute of

limitations is not an affirmative defense to the allegations in
the divorce complaint but rather is a matter of substantive law
which can be asserted to challenge the sufficiency of a liability
claim.
From the checks in Exhibit P-1, only $4,870 of these
amounts were advanced· following December 8, 197 5, the date for the
running of the statute of limitations for claims under the necessity
statute.

The amount of the liability is further limited by the

fact that the family only lived together until August 28, 1978.
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-9 states:
The expenses of the family and the education
of the children are chargeable upon the
property of both husband and wife or of either
of them, and in relation thereto, they may be
sued jointly or separately.
In Berow vs·. Shields, 48 Utah 270, 159 Pac. 538 (1916),
the plaintiff merchant extended credit to the defendant wife for
certain purchases of clothing.

The trial court held the defendant

husband not liable for the debts incurred by the wife for the goods
and merchandise supplied to the defendant wife following. the termination of the family relationship.

The court stated two pre-

requisites for recovery under the necessity statute, namely (1) the
relation of husband and wife must exist and (_2) the expenses for
which either or both spouses· are liable must be "family expenses".
As to whether a family relationship existed, the court
cited with approval Gilman· Vs. Matthe'ws, 20 Colo. App. 170, 77 Pac.
366 (1904) as follows:
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In an action against a wife for wearing
apparel purchased and worn by the husband,
it is not sufficient to sho"w that they are
husband and wife, but it must also be shown
th~t they are living together, so as to
constitute a family. 48 Utah at 275.
As of August 28, 1978, the plaintiff intentionally and
permanently placed the defendant in the Plantation Convalescent
Center. ·This severed the family relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant so as to disallow any claims against the defendant
for "family expenses" incurred after this date.

The amount of the

money advanced to Joel Izatt following December 8, 1975 and before
August 28, 1978 is $1,595.
The purpose of the necessity statute as set forth in
Berow vs. Shields, ·su·p·ra. at 277, is to protect merchants and
traders as well as husband and wife.

A merchant or trader is not

in a position to know of the financial or marital status of those
with whom he deals.

Consequently, protection for these persons

providing necessities is proper and is provided by the statute.
The plaintiff's parents are not merchants or traders and were fully
able to protect themselves against any potential losses for advances
made to th~ plaintiff had such been their intention.

They were in

a position to determine the financial position of the plaintiff and
the need for the money, but chose to rely upon the plaintiff's
representations. Consequently, the necessity statute does not
validate claims such as the one made D.y the plaintiff.
The ·testimony of the· plaintiff and the plaintiff's father

indicates th~t th~y enjoyed a close father-son relationship.
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I

However, the testimony does not substantiate the amount of the
debts, the terms of the payment or the binding nature of the
obligation.

For example, upon direct examination by Mr. Madsen as

to the amount

agre~d

upon to be paid for the painting, the plaintiff's

father testified that a mee.tin.g took place which involved the
plaintiff, the defendant, the plaintiff's mother and the plaintiff's
father.

The painting was discussed at this

for the painting was set.

meeti~g,

but no price

The testimony continued and it was

stated that at another time a value of $1,500 was set.

While the

plaintiff did establish some foundation for the testimony regarding
the original meeting involving the plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff's
mother and plaintiff's father, no foundation was established as to
the meeting when the agreement as to the $1,500 was established.
Consequently, this testimony should not have been received.

(T

407-410)
On cross-examination, the plaintiff's father testified
that he would help the plaintiff without regard to the plaintiff's
ability to repay the debt.

While the plaintiff's father testified

that he discussed the necessity of the requests made by the plaintiff,
he did not, at any time, know or inquire abut the income of the
plaintiff.

The plantiff's father testified that if he

~he

plain-

tiff) had been able to do it himself he would not have asked me
(the plaintiff's father}.

(_T 433-435)

This testimony is contradictory
-

to the plaintiff's father's testimony on direct examination where
he stated that they would· talk about the request to determine if

-17-
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they were really necessary.

Further, there is no indication,

except for the plaintiff's testimony that the amounts were expended
for medical care or
ness.

oth~r

costs relating to the defendant's ill-

This evidence doei not· meet with the test of

B~~ow

which

clearly requires that it be shown that the expenses be for "family
expenses".

POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO A
LIEN FOR ONE-HALF OF THE EQUITY IN THE
PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFNDANT'S '"REAL PROPERTY.
The Court awarded the defendant a lien of $13,500 in the
real property owned by the parties.

This lien is for twenty-five

percent of the estimated equity of the parties in the real

proper~.

The lien is without interest and is payable only upon (1) the
resale of the home; (2) the plaintiff no longer using the home as a
residence for himself and the family; and (3) the youngest child
reaching majority.

Originally, the Court ordered a fourth limita-,

1

tion which required payment of the lien upon the plaintiff's remarri
The defendant stipulated to allow this restriction to be removed
because the plaintiff had already remarried.

The defendant did so

because of the defendant's desire to assist in the raising of her
children and to allow them to grow up in the home they were alrea~
living in.

However, the defendant did not stipulate to any reductioi

of the or.igina1 lien which was established for one-half of the
equity in the real property.
By allowi~g the· plaintiff tO' retain posse·ssion of the
real property, the de·fendant has contributed to the plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

and the family, in effect, a term for years for approximately
twelve years until

th~

time the last child reaches majority.

The

defendant is foregoing any return on investment on her interest in
the real property during this period of time; will not be compensated for any loss in purchasing power which results because of
inflation or otherwise during this period of time; will not share
in any future increases in the value of the real property; and is
providing a place to

li~e

for the plaintiff, the plaintiff's new

wife and the children of the plaintiff and the defendant.

This

means that the defendant has bestowed a substantial ecomonic
benefit on the plaintiff and the family and should be entitled to
a lien equivalent to at least one-half of the equity in the real
property.
The major portion of the marital assets consisted
of the real property.

The distribution of the other marital assets

and liabilities (except the debt to the plaintiff's parents) are
not issues on appeal.
The trial court, in Supplemental Findings of Fact 19
stated:

"The Court finds that the plaintiff has sustained trauma

and medical problems resulting from the defendant·' s injuries and
condition as a result thereof; the Court has taken this into
consideration, together with the responsibility and the expense
which plaintiff will have in raising the minor children in determining what is fair and equitaole between the parties."

(T 223)
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As stated in Jo·hn·s·o'n vs·.· ·Johns·on, supra. , a party's injuries and
condition do not substantiate the right of another party to a
divorce on th.e grounds of mental cruelty.

Likewise, the

injuries and physical condition of a party do not entitle another
party to compensation.

In short, a divorce action is not a person8

injury action.
It is unfair and inequitable for the defendant to
receive a lien for only one-fourth of the equity in the real
property in light of the contributions and sacrifices made by the
defendant.

The ·defendant is no longer able to live in her home;

she is separated from her children; the plaintiff and his new
wife are making use of the property without compensation to the
defendant; she is directly subsidizing the housing costs of the
plaintiff, his new wife and the children for the next twelve years;
and she is not receiving any support from the plaintiff (except
for alimony of $1.00 per year).

The defendant served faithfully

and well for 16 years as the plaintiff's wife and the mother of
their four children.
CONCLUION
The circumstances which the parties have faced since
May, 1973, have been unfortunate.

Following an "ideal" marriage,

the defendant has been separated permanently from her husband and
her children.

It is unlikely that she will remarry.

The tragedy

of the situation sfro"uld ae· minimized D..y correctly applying the
law as follows:
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The plaintiff should not be. granted a divorce against
the defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty.

Suffering from a

physical injury or condition does not constitute mental cruelty.
The 'liability to the plaintiff's parents should not be
allowed because:

(1) the liability is supported only by moral

consideration; (2) the advances· made were gifts; (3) the liability
is legally unenforceable under the riecessity statute and/or the
statute of limitations, and/or (4) the evidence is insufficient to
establish the claim.

The plaintiff's parents are not parties to

this action nor does the Court have any jurisdiction over them.
Consequently, no award by way of the Supplemental Decree should
have been made to them.

At most, the plaintiff and defendant

should be made liable for one-half of the claim of the plaintiff's
parents.

The plaintiff's parents would then be in the proper

position of being required to assert their claim on their own
behalf.
During the parties' marriage, they accumulated a moderate
marital estate consisting primarily of the equity in their real
property.

The amount of this equity is approximately $54,000.

The

defendant, being the wife of the plaintiff of 16 years and the
mother of the parties' four children, is equitably entitled to more
than a $13,500, no interest lien in the real property when the
plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property for himself,
his new wife, and the· children.

-21Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The defendant respectfully submits that the District
Court's grant of a divorce to the plaintiff against the defendant
should be reversed, that the defendant should not be responsible
for any obligation to the plainti£f's parents and that the
defendant sh6uld be entitled to a lieri for one-half of the equity
in the parties' real property.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [)*=_A. day of May, 1980.

HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON
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TIMOTHY R.
Attorneys for Defendant
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of

the foregoing to Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings,
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant Joel
H.

Izatt, 320 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah

+l.
~
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84111, this

d a y o f May , 19 8 O.
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